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Abstract 15 
Bodily boundaries are computed by integrating multisensory bodily signals and can be 16 
experimentally manipulated using bodily illusions. Research on tool use demonstrates that 17 
tools alter body representations motorically to account for changes in a user’s action 18 
repertoire. The present experiment sought to unify perceptual and motoric accounts of tool 19 
embodiment using a modified Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) that also addressed the skill and 20 
practice aspects of the tool use literature. In Experiment 1, synchronous multisensory 21 
stimulation induced perceptual embodiment of a tool, chopsticks. The embodiment of 22 
chopsticks was stronger for more skilled participants, and if the illusion was preceded by tool 23 
use. In Experiment 2, the illusion was not elicited with a different type of tool, a teacup, 24 
showing that not all objects can be incorporated. This experiment helps to clarify the role of 25 
perceptual and motoric embodiment and suggests future avenues for research into tools 26 
embodiment using this method.  27 
 28 
1. Introduction 29 
The representation of the body is remarkably flexible. The brain continuously integrates 30 
a complex stream of sensory inputs and uses this information to dynamically scale the 31 
representation of the body according to its current state (e.g. Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 32 
Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris, 2008, 2010). This flexibility makes it possible to efficiently interact 33 
with the environment and is strikingly important during tool use. 34 
Successful tool use expands the physical limits of the wielder’s body and facilitates a 35 
dramatic increase in action capacity (Shumaker, Walkup, & Beck, 2011; Vaesen, 2012). 36 
Experimental research indicates that the flexibility of the body representation contributes to 37 
the human tool proficiency. Psychophysical studies demonstrate that the physical expansion 38 
afforded by a tool is accompanied by an incorporation of the tool in the body representation, 39 
such that the tool is treated as an extension of the limb wielding it (e.g. Cardinali et al., 2009; 40 
Maravita, Spence, Kennett, & Driver, 2002). 41 
If tools are treated as an extension of the wielder’s body, then might the extended body 42 
representation also demonstrate the same ability to plastically adapt to multisensory stimuli? 43 
The present work set out to shed light on this issue. In particular, we asked whether the 44 
manipulation of multisensory stimuli could induce a recalibration of the extended body 45 
representation encompassing both the tool and the effector wielding it. Furthermore, we 46 
aimed to examine whether skill and previous experience with a particular tool modulate the 47 
representational plasticity of the body.  48 
Recent advances in our knowledge of how the brain represents the body have been 49 
pioneered through the experimental use of perceptual illusions. One of the most used and best 50 
known paradigms is the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) ( Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In its 51 
classic form, synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation of a rubber hand and the participant’s 52 
hidden hand induces a recalibration of the proprioceptive felt position of the participants’ 53 
hand and a feeling ownership of the rubber hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Costantini, 54 
2014; Tsakiris, 2016; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). This has been classically interpreted in the 55 
literature as evidence that the manipulation of multisensory inputs (i.e. visual and tactile 56 
stimulation), can induce the embodiment of an external, dummy hand into one’s own body 57 
representation (Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson, 2012), for a different view (David, Fiori, & Aglioti, 58 
2014). Similar experiences of illusory ownership have been obtained, for example, for faces ( 59 
Tsakiris, 2008), whole bodies (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008), and even for virtual avatars 60 
(Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013; Hägni et al., 2008; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & 61 
Sanchez-Vives, 2008) and small dolls (van der Hoort, Guterstam, & Ehrsson, 2011). 62 
Together, these findings show that the multisensory representation of our body is not fixed 63 
and immutable, but rather extremely flexible and continuously updated through the 64 
integration of multisensory information (for a review, see Costantini, 2014). This scalability 65 
of the body representation is also thought to contribute to human tool use proficiency (e.g., 66 
Cardinali et al., 2012). When we use tools to manipulate the environment, the brain receives 67 
somatosensory signals evoked at the hand wielding the tool. Yet, we often have the subjective 68 
feeling that the touch is occurring on the tip of the tool itself. This feeling seems to be a by-69 
product of how the body representation is rescaled to incorporate the tool.  70 
For instance, seminal work with both humans and primates demonstrated that the use of 71 
a tool for a prolonged period of time extends the multisensory neural representations of the 72 
space surrounding the hand (Bonifazi, Farnè, Rinaldesi, & Làdavas, 2007; Iriki, Tanaka, & 73 
Iwamura, 1996). Similarly, Cardinali et al. showed that tool use can induce a morphological 74 
update of the body representation (Cardinali et al., 2011; Cardinali et al., 2009), and of body 75 
kinematics (Cardinali, Brozzoli, Finos, Roy, & Farnè, 2016; Cardinali et al., 2011; Cardinali 76 
et al., 2012). This modification of the body representation is likely to reflect an incorporation 77 
of the tool into the body representation. For instance, a series of studies showed that the 78 
tactile signals felt in the hand that occur when a held tool comes into contact with an object 79 
are referred directly to the tip of the tool (Maravita et al., 2002; Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 80 
2001; Yamamoto, Moizumi, & Kitazawa, 2005). Moreover, the self-produced touch 81 
attenuation phenomena occurs when the participant touches his or her own limb using a tool: 82 
self-produced touches are lighter than identical touches applied by another because these 83 
touches have already been anticipated by a forward sensory model that takes handheld tools 84 
into account (Kilteni & Ehrsson, 2017). In other words, even though the somatosensory 85 
signal is originating from the receptors located on the hand, the brain treats this information 86 
as if it originated from the tip of the tool.  87 
Overall, previous studies suggest that the brain uses the available sensory information 88 
coming from different modalities to infer the structure of a wielded tool and create a unified, 89 
extended representation of the body plus the tool. If tools are treated as part of one’s own 90 
body representation, one could ask to what extent the representation of the embodied tool 91 
shares similar properties with the representation of the body itself? In particular, we asked 92 
wether manipulating the multisensory stimuli perceived through the tool can induce a 93 
recalibration of this extended body representation, as assessed by the Rubber Hand Illusion. 94 
In fact, while it is well established that the manipulation of multisensory stimuli (as in the 95 
RHI) can induce a recalibration of the body representation, it is still unknown whether this is 96 
also true for the extended representation encompassing the embodied tool.  97 
The current experiments investigated this issue. In particular, we hypothesized the 98 
importance of three factors for the modified RHI illusion to occur: a) the type of tool (and in 99 
particular, the match or mismatch between the tool’s function and the grip exerted to wield 100 
the tool) b) one’s level of proficiency in using the tool, and c) recency of experience with the 101 
tool. These points are explained in greater detail in the following sections. To test these 102 
hypotheses, we conducted two experiments.  103 
2. Experiment 1 104 
2.1 Introduction 105 
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether multisensory stimulation 106 
(i.e. visual and tactile) would induce a recalibration of the felt position of the body plus the 107 
tool. We used a modified version of the Rubber Hand Illusion in which the participant and the 108 
rubber hand both held a pair of chopsticks. Rather than applying stimulation to the fingers of 109 
the real and fake hand, the experimenter brushed the tip of the chopsticks held by the 110 
participant and by the rubber hand. Thus, no stimulation was delivered directly to the 111 
participant’s hand, though the participant was still able to feel the contact between the brush 112 
and chopstick. As controls for multisensory stimulation and visual similarity, we manipulated 113 
the synchrony of the visuo-tactile stimulation and used a non-hand shaped object (Figure 1B), 114 
respectively. The participant held the tool while viewing the non-hand shaped object (a block 115 
of wood with the outline of a hand) during the visual similarity control conditions. We 116 
expected participants to experience the illusion only after receiving synchronous stimulation 117 
at the tip of the chopsticks held by the rubber hand. 118 
Our choice to use chopsticks was based on several considerations. First, previous 119 
studies have already shown that tools like drumsticks (e.g.Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001; 120 
Yamamoto et al., 2005), and chopsticks (Rademaker, Wu, Bloem, & Sack, 2014) can be 121 
incorporated in the body representation. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the functional 122 
characteristics of a non-body shaped tool would be crucial for its incorporation, and therefore 123 
for the update of the extended body representation in the RHI. This hypothesis is supported 124 
by recent evidence showing that the embodiment of tools is constrained not only by the 125 
morphology of the tool, but also by its functionality (Miller, Longo, & Saygin, 2014). Though 126 
chopsticks violate the morphological similarity between the participant’s hand and the viewed 127 
object, they are manipulated using a precision grip and they function to extend the fingers in 128 
a precision grip action (Goldenberg & Iriki, 2007). Thus, chopsticks are morphologically 129 
dissimilar, but have a functional match with the human fingers. Past literature has focused 130 
primarily on the incorporation of simple hand-held tools, such as sticks (e.g.Maravita, 131 
Husain, Clarke, & Driver, 2001; Maravita et al., 2002; Neppi-Mòdona et al., 2007; Yamamoto 132 
et al., 2005), rakes (e.g. Iriki et al., 1996; Farnè & Làdavas, 2000; (Bonifazi et al., 2007; 133 
Farnè & Làdavas, 2000; Iriki et al., 1996; Jovanov, Clifton, Mazalek, Nitsche, & Welsh, 134 
2015), and mechanical grabbers (e.g.Cardinali et al., 2011; Cardinali et al., 2009; Cardinali et 135 
al., 2012). The use of these tools rely more on information coming from proximal parts of the 136 
hand and arm representation, while chopsticks rely more on finger representation (Rademaker 137 
et al., 2014). Thus, although much of the past literature on tool use has focused on larger, 138 
reach extending tools like mechanical grabbers, chopsticks seem suitable for use with the 139 
RHI paradigm because of the active involvement of the hand and fingers during chopstick 140 
use.  141 
A second aim of the experiment was to investigate the role of tool proficiency in the 142 
plasticity of the body representation. We hypothesized that the update of the body 143 
representation toward the external tool, as indexed by the successful induction of the RHI, 144 
would be greater when participants: a) had recent practice with the tool, and b) were more 145 
skilled in using the tool. Previous studies demonstrate that these two factors (practice and 146 
skill) facilitate the embodiment of a tool (e.g., Rademaker et al., 2014). Thus, we predicted 147 
that this facilitation would also reflect in the dynamic update of the extended body 148 
representation. The choice of chopsticks was particularly conducive to addressing this aim. 149 
Chopsticks are one of the most commonly used tools in the world: more than 30% of human 150 
population uses chopsticks on a daily basis (Kitamura, Higashi, Masaki, & Kishino, 1999). 151 
Despite their global popularity, many people struggle with chopstick use. For instance, in a 152 
2014 chopstick proficiency survey of Americans, 4% of those surveyed considered 153 
themselves experts at using chopsticks, 11% rated themselves as very good, 19% fair, 20% 154 
not very good, 23% terrible, while 24% stated that they had never even tried them 155 
(http://www.statista.com/, 2014). This large variation in chopstick skill within the general 156 
population made it easy to test the impact of individual differences in tool skill on tool 157 
embodiment. To test the relevance of both skill and recent practice, we designed a task that 158 
would both measure the relative tool skill of our participants and provide them with practice 159 
manipulating the tool (Bead-Transfer Task, see Methods). 160 
2.2 Methods 161 
2.2.1 Participants 162 
Fifty-seven right-handed individuals (mean age 18.8) participated in exchange for 163 
credit in an introductory psychology course at the University of Virginia. Twenty-seven 164 
participants (17 females) performed the bead-transfer task prior to experiencing the 165 
chopstick-version of the rubber hand illusion (CRHI), while the remaining 30 participants (16 166 
females) performed the bead-transfer task after undergoing the illusion. All participants were 167 
right-handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision, and provided written informed 168 
consent prior to participation in the study.  169 
2.2.2 Materials 170 
Chopstick Rubber Hand. A cast of the first author’s hand holding chopsticks was 171 
made from flesh-tinted plastic resin. The chopsticks were glued to the hand to minimize 172 
chopstick movement during the experimental procedure (Figure 1A). An identical pair of 173 
chopsticks was held by the participant throughout the duration of the experiment. 174 
A.  
B.  C.  
Figure 1. (A) The rubber hand holding chopsticks used in 
Experiment 1. (B) The wooden block used in both Experiment 1 and 
2. (C) The rubber hand holding the teacup used in Experiment 2. 
 175 
Bead-Transfer Task. Plastic beads measuring 0.8 cm in diameter were utilized in a task 176 
designed to measure participant chopstick proficiency. Participants were given a tray 177 
containing 270 beads of various colors and instructed to sort by color as many beads as 178 
possible by transferring them to a container with 6 compartments. Each of the six 179 
compartments was designated to hold a particular color of bead. There were 30 beads of each 180 
color to be sorted, and 90 “distractor beads.” Participants were required to move all beads of 181 
one color to the container before starting on the next color. Participants were allotted 5 182 
minutes to transfer as many beads as possible. The number of beads transferred was recorded 183 
and used as a proxy value for participant chopstick skill. 184 
 185 
Rubber hand illusion questionnaire. We adapted a total of 25 questions from Longo 186 
and colleagues (Longo et al., 2008) to measure the subjective experience of the CRHI (See 187 
Appendix A). In particular, the questions adopted referred to five different components of the 188 
experience of the illusion: embodiment of the rubber hand (ten statements), loss of the real 189 
hand (five statements), movement of the real or rubber hand (three statements), deafference 190 
of the real hand (three statements), and affect (three statements). All questions were modified 191 
to refer to the chopsticks held by the rubber hand, rather than to the rubber hand itself.  192 
2.2.3 Experimental design 193 
A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design was employed. The viewed object (chopstick rubber hand 194 
versus piece of wood) and timing of visuo-tactile stimulation (synchronous versus 195 
asynchronous) were within subjects factors. The experimental group (Bead-Transfer Task 196 
Prior to the Illusion versus After the Illusion) was the between subjects factor. The 4 within-197 
subjects conditions were: (i) chopstick rubber hand synchronous; (ii) chopstick rubber hand 198 
asynchronous; (iii) wooden block synchronous; and (iv) wooden block asynchronous. The 199 
piece of wood was a 9 cm x 23 cm x 2 cm plain wooden block, pale and beige in color, with 200 
the outline of a hand drawn on the surface in black ink (Figure 1B). This wooden stimulus 201 
was comparable in overall size to the chopstick rubber hand.  202 
In the synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation conditions, the experimenter used 2 203 
paintbrushes to manually stroke the tip of the participant’s held chopsticks and the viewed 204 
object at the same time. In the asynchronous visuo-tactile conditions, the experimenter 205 
stroked the participant’s chopsticks first, while the viewed object was stroked with a latency 206 
of 500-1000 ms. Each stimulation period lasted 180 s and was timed using a stopwatch. 207 
During the chopstick rubber hand condition, the tip of the chopsticks held by the rubber hand 208 
were stroked, whereas the front edge of the wooden block was stroked during the wooden 209 
block condition. Although participants held the tool in all 4 conditions, the chopsticks were 210 
not attached to the wooden block, and so were not visible during either of the wooden block 211 
conditions. Almost all participants spontaneously reported that they were surprised that they 212 
could feel the touch of the paintbrush on the tip of their chopsticks. Indeed, experimenters 213 
were instructed to apply enough pressure to the chopsticks that the contact would be felt.  214 
2.2.4 Procedure 215 
Participants were greeted and informed that they would be using chopsticks and 216 
making self-perception estimates throughout the duration of the experiment. If participants 217 
indicated that they did not know how to hold or use chopsticks, the experimenter 218 
demonstrated proper chopstick technique and offered chopstick pointers as the participant 219 
briefly practiced manipulating the tool. Depending on group assignment, all participants 220 
either first completed the bead-transfer task or proceeded directly to the illusion phase and 221 
completed the bead-transfer task upon its conclusion. During the illusion phase, participants 222 
were seated across from the experimenter with their right hand placed inside a specially 223 
constructed box, measuring 100 cm in width, 40 cm in height, and 20 cm in depth. The box 224 
was divided into three compartments of equal size, and the rubber hand rested inside the 225 
central compartment in front of the subject’s midline. The rubber hand and the participant’s 226 
hand were aligned such that both rested at the same distance in front of the participant’s 227 
chest. The lateral distance between the tip of the participant’s chopsticks and the tip of the 228 
chopsticks held by the rubber hand was 25.5 cm. The top of the box was covered by a one-229 
way mirror. The portion of the one-way mirror above the compartment containing the 230 
participant’s hand was obstructed such that the interior of the compartment could not be seen 231 
by the participant at any time during the experiment, and the surface always appeared to be a 232 
regular, two-way mirror (Figure 2).  233 
 
Figure 2. The top of Rubber Hand Illusion box was covered by a one-way mirror. A light 
inside the center portion of the box was illuminated during the illusion phase, allowing the 
participant to see the rubber hand holding the chopsticks. The portion of the one-way mirror 
above the compartment containing the participant’s hand was obstructed such that the interior 
of the compartment could not be seen by the participant at any time during the experiment 
and the surface always appeared to be an ordinary mirror. Two identical paint brushes 
delivered visuo-tactile stimulation to the tip of the chopsticks throughout the experiment.  
  234 
The lighting in the central compartment containing the chopstick rubber hand was 235 
manipulated throughout the experiment. During the visuo-tactile stimulation phases, 236 
illumination from within the compartment caused the mirror to be transparent, allowing the 237 
participant to view the rubber hand or the wooden block as it was stimulated by the 238 
experimenter. During the proprioceptive judgment phase (described below), the surface of the 239 
mirror was illuminated from above such that the mirror was opaque and reflective, obscuring 240 
the rubber hand from view. 241 
 In the proprioceptive judgment phase, the perceived position of the participant’s hand 242 
and chopsticks was used as an implicit, quantitative proxy for measuring the strength of the 243 
illusion. A ruler with the numbers printed in reverse was supported between two poles 45 cm 244 
above the box. When illuminated from above, the mirrored surface of the box allowed for the 245 
numbers to be reflected in their proper orientation and they appeared at the same gaze depth 246 
as the chopstick rubber hand.  247 
At the start of the judgment phase, participants were asked to report verbally the 248 
number on the ruler that was directly above the tip of their held chopsticks. They were 249 
instructed to make this judgment by projecting a parasagittal line from the tip of their 250 
chopsticks up to the ruler. Between each visuo-tactile stimulation and judgment phase, the 251 
ruler was always shifted to a different random position such that the numbers the participant 252 
viewed during the judgment phases were always different. This ensured that participants did 253 
not memorize previously stated numbers and insured that the participant estimated the 254 
proprioceptively perceived position of their hand independently during each condition. 255 
Upon completion of each condition (Chopsticks Rubber Hand Synchronous, 256 
Chopsticks Rubber Hand Asynchronous, Wooden Block Synchronous, Wooden Block 257 
Asynchronous), participants were asked to respond to the Rubber Hand Illusion 258 
Questionnaire. A brief rest period followed each questionnaire. During the rest period, the 259 
participant was encouraged to set down their chopsticks and move their hand and body to 260 
prevent transfer of the illusion across conditions. At the start of each new condition, the 261 
experimenter then gently repositioned the participant’s hand and chopsticks in the correct 262 
position in preparation for the next trial.  263 
2.2.5 Results 264 
Proprioceptive Drift  265 
Participants made a baseline judgment of the location of the tip of their held chopsticks 266 
before each stimulation trial, and another judgment following stimulation. The difference 267 
between these two judgments represented the change in perceived hand position due to the 268 
stimulation, and was used as a measure of the strength of the illusion. In the literature, this 269 
difference value (post-illusion position minus pre-illusion position) is known as 270 
proprioceptive drift. A positive proprioceptive drift value indicates that the participant judged 271 
the positon of their own hand and chopsticks as closer to the viewed object after stimulation 272 
than before. In contrast, a negative proprioceptive drift corresponds to a mislocalization of 273 
the participant’s hand and chopsticks away from the viewed object.  274 
Assumptions of normal distribution, independence of residuals, and sphericity were 275 
met. To examine how proprioceptive drift was influenced by participant hand-object 276 
correspondence, visuo-tactile stimulation, tool skill, and recentness of tool use, we ran a 277 
mixed ANOVA and fit a linear mixed effects model. In both analyses, viewed object 278 
(chopstick rubber hand vs. wooden block) and timing of visuo-tactile stimulation 279 
(synchronous vs. asynchronous) were within subject factors, number of beads transferred was 280 
a covariate, and experimental group (bead-transfer task Prior to the Illusion versus After the 281 
Illusion) was the between group factor. The linear mixed effects model had participant as a 282 
random factor, which facilitated the examination of individual differences in RHI 283 
susceptibility that are frequently documented throughout the literature.  284 
 285 
 Figure 3. The significant interaction between viewed object and timing of visuo-tactile 
stimulation (F(1,53) = 9.92, p < 0.01) demonstrates that participants experienced the most 
proprioceptive drift when they were viewing the chopstick-holding rubber hand and viewing 
stroking of the rubber hand’s chopsticks that was synchronized with the stroking of their own 
held chopsticks. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 286 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of viewed object (F(1,53) = 5.74, p < 287 
0.05) and timing of visuo-tactile stimulation (F(1,53) = 8.44, p < 0.01), as well as an 288 
interaction between these two conditions (F(1,53) = 9.92, p < 0.01), depicted in Figure 3. 289 
Pairwise comparisons statistics indicate that participants’ proprioceptive drift was higher in 290 
the chopstick rubber hand synchronous condition (M = 2.68 cm, SD=3.39) than in the other 291 
experimental conditions (Rubber Hand asynchronous: M=0.03 cm, SD=2.72; t(55)=3.47, p < 292 
0.001; Wood synchronous: M=0.25 cm, SD=3.29; t(55)=3.30, p < 0.001; Wood 293 
asynchronous: M= 0.36 cm, SD=3.79; t(55)=3.08, p < 0.001). These findings indicate that the 294 
illusion was successfully induced. 295 
 Figure 4. Participants who used the chopsticks prior to experiencing the CRHI experienced 
greater proprioceptive drift—regardless of timing or object—than those who used the 
chopsticks after the induction of the illusion. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
There was also a significant main effect of experimental group (F(1,53) = 5.5, p <0.05), 296 
whereby participants who used the chopsticks prior to experiencing the CRHI experienced 297 
greater proprioceptive drift—regardless of timing or object—than those who used the 298 
chopsticks after the induction of the illusion (Figure 4). Additionally, there was a significant 299 
interaction between timing of visuo-tactile stimulation and chopstick skill: (F(1,53) = 4.09, p 300 
< 0.05). In the synchronous visuo-tactile condition only, participants who transferred more 301 
beads (and were therefore more skilled chopstick users) experienced more drift than 302 
participants who were less skilled in chopstick use (Figure 5).  303 
The results for the linear mixed effects model with participant as a random factor 304 
resulted in comparable findings. Crucially, the interaction between viewed object and visuo-305 
tactile stimulation was significant (Wald Chi-Square(1) = 14.09, p < 0.001), as was the 306 
interaction between timing of visuo-tactile stimulation and chopstick skill, (Wald Chi-307 
Square(1) = 5.82, p < 0.05). Additionally, this analysis also revealed two significant three-308 
way interactions. The first was between viewed object, timing of visuo-tactile stimulation, 309 
and chopstick skill (Wald Chi-Square(1) = 4.02, p < 0.05). The other three-way interaction 310 
was between viewed object, time of tool use, and chopstick skill (Wald Chi-Square(1) = 4.88, 311 
p < 0.05). The data for the three-way interactions is summarized in Tables 1 and 2 in 312 
Appendix B.  313 
 
Figure 5. The significant interaction between timing of visuo-tactile stimulation and 
chopstick skill (F(1,53) = 4.09, p < 0.05) indicates that when visuo-tactile stimulation is 
synchronous, participants who transferred more beads (and were therefore more skilled 
chopstick users) experienced more drift than participants who were less skilled in chopstick 
use. Shaded bands represent ±1 SEM. 
Rubber Hand Illusion Questionnaire 314 
The mean ratings for the 5 components of the rubber hand illusion questionnaire 315 
(Embodiment, Loss of one’s hand, Movement, Affect, and Deafference) were submitted to a 316 
mixed ANOVA with the 4 illusion conditions (synchronous and asynchronous chopstick 317 
rubber hand vs. synchronous and asynchronous wooden block), and the 5 components of the 318 
illusion as within subject factors. Group (tool use prior vs. after the illusion) was the between 319 
subjects factor.  320 
The ANOVA revealed significant main effects of questionnaire component (F(1,53) = 321 
80.30, p < 0.001), illusion condition (F(1,53) = 16.16, p < 0.001), and group (F(1,53) = 322 
17.87, p < 0.001). The interactions were not significant (all F’s < 3.0).  323 
Planned comparisons between illusion conditions revealed a significant difference in 324 
responses to items related to Embodiment: (synchronous chopsticks: M = -0.05, SD = 1.45; 325 
asynchronous Chopsticks: M = -1.21, SD = 1.39; synchronous wooden block: M = -1.17, SD 326 
= 1.37; asynchronous wooden block: M = -1.63, SD = 1.14; (F(1,3) = 14.23, p < 0.001). 327 
There was also a significant difference in responses to the Movement-related items on the 328 
questionnaire: (synchronous chopsticks: M = -0.98, SD = 1.30; asynchronous Chopsticks: M 329 
= -1.45, SD = 1.31; synchronous wooden block: M = -1.60, SD = 1.06; asynchronous wooden 330 
block: M = -1.70, SD = 1.16; (F(1,3) = 3.92, p < 0.01). These results indicate that the 331 
synchrony of visuo-tactile stimulation and the visual correspondence between the 332 
participant’s own hand and the viewed hand were necessary for participants to report 333 
embodying the rubber hand and moreover, to endorse items relating to the experience of their 334 
hand and the rubber hand moving closer to one another (Figure 6).  335 
 Figure 6. A comparison of illusions conditions revealed a significant difference in responses to 
items related to Embodiment and to the Movement-related items on the questionnaire. 
Differences between the critical, synchronous chopstick condition and the other conditions 
indicates that the synchrony of visuo-tactile stimulation and the visual correspondence between 
the participant’s own hand were necessary for participants to report embodying the rubber hand 
and to report experiences of their hand and the rubber hand moving closer to one another. Error 
bars represent ±1 SEM. 
3. Experiment 2  336 
3.1 Introduction 337 
Experiment 2 investigated the role of tool functionality in determining the modification 338 
of the body representation. In Experiment 1, multisensory stimulation caused an update of the 339 
proprioceptive felt position of the embodied tool toward an external object, but the extent of 340 
this representational plasticity is not clear. In Experiment 1, we hypothesized that the match 341 
between the tool’s function and its manner of manipulation was crucial for the embodiment of 342 
the tool and the subsequent recalibration of its proprioceptive felt position following the 343 
illusion. Chopsticks mimic and extend the precision grip of the hand holding them. However, 344 
the results of Experiment 1 do not rule out the possibility that the observed effect is 345 
independent of the type of tool in our modified RHI paradigm. Therefore, Experiment 2 used 346 
the same experimental paradigm but the chopsticks were substituted with a teacup to further 347 
test the role of tool functionality for the embodiment of the tool and the recalibration of its 348 
proprioceptive felt position. Like chopsticks, teacups are simple, hand-held tools that 349 
augment manual actions in a non-arbitrary manner (Goldenberg & Iriki, 2007). Teacups 350 
mimic cupped hands to hold and transfer liquids, and like chopsticks, they rely primarily on 351 
finger prehension for dexterous use, rather than on proximal information coming from the 352 
forearm. However, unlike chopsticks, there is a mismatch between the way teacups are held 353 
and their function. A precision grip is used to hold a teacup by its handle, but a teacup itself 354 
does not imitate or extend a precision action. Rather, a teacup replicates the cupping of a 355 
hand and is therefore more similar to whole hand prehension. 356 
3.2 Methods 357 
3.2.1 Participants 358 
Forty-six right-handed individuals (mean age 18.69) participated in exchange for 359 
payment or credit in an introductory psychology course at the University of Virginia. Data 360 
from 2 participants were excluded due to experimenter error and the data of an additional 5 361 
participants was excluded due to excessive movement of the participant’s hand during the 362 
illusion procedure. Of the remaining 39 participants, 18 participants (15 females) performed 363 
the water-transfer task prior to experiencing the teacup-version of the rubber hand illusion 364 
(TRHI), while the remaining 21 participants (17 females) performed the water-transfer task 365 
after undergoing the illusion. All participants provided written informed consent prior to 366 
participation in the study and were right-handed with normal or corrected to normal vision.  367 
3.2.2 Materials 368 
Teacup Rubber Hand. A posable hand-manikin with a realistic silicon skin designed 369 
for prosthetic use was positioned to hold a small teacup that measured 17 cm high and 16 cm 370 
in diameter (Figure 1C). An identical teacup was held by the participant throughout the 371 
duration of the experiment. 372 
Water-Transfer Task. Participants were required to transfer as much water from one 373 
location to another by carrying teacups filled to the brim. The experimenter would start a 374 
timer for 3 minutes as soon as participants lifted the first full teacup off the table. The 375 
experimenter would then immediately fill another teacup to the brim with water so that by the 376 
time the participant walked the 5.56 m to the dumping point and back, the next teacup was 377 
waiting. This process was repeated as many times as possible within the 3-minute time limit. 378 
Participants were instructed to return to the starting point and start over with a new full 379 
teacup if any water was spilled en route. The number of spills as well as the total weight (in 380 
grams) of the water the participant transferred was used as a proxy value for participant 381 
“teacup skill,” analogues to the bead-transfer task used in Experiment 1. 382 
 383 
Rubber hand illusion questionnaire. The same 25 questions from Longo and 384 
colleagues (Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2009) employed in Experiment 1 385 
were again used to measure the subjective experience of the TRHI. All questions were 386 
modified to refer to the teacup held by the rubber hand, rather than to the rubber hand itself. 387 
For example, the statements would read “the rubber hand holding the teacup belongs to me,” 388 
or “I have control over the teacup the rubber hand is holding.” As in Experiment 1, 389 
participants completed four versions of the questionnaire, one for each experimental 390 
condition. Participants answered each statement by choosing a number from a 7-point Likert 391 
Scale that ranged from -3 “strongly disagree” to +3 “strongly agree”.  392 
3.3.3 Experimental design 393 
As in Experiment 1, a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design was employed. The viewed object (teacup 394 
rubber hand versus piece of wood) and timing of visuo-tactile stimulation (synchronous 395 
versus asynchronous) were within-subject factors. The experimental group (Water-Transfer 396 
Task Prior to the Illusion versus After the Illusion) was the between-subject factor. The four 397 
within-subject conditions were: (i) teacup rubber hand synchronous; (ii) teacup rubber hand 398 
asynchronous; (iii) wooden block synchronous; and (iv) wooden block asynchronous. The 399 
piece of wood was identical to the one used in Experiment 1.  400 
In the synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation conditions, the experimenter used 2 401 
paintbrushes to manually stroke the forward edge of the participant’s held teacup and the 402 
viewed object at the same time. In the asynchronous visuo-tactile conditions, the 403 
experimenter stroked the participant’s teacup first, while the viewed object was stroked with a 404 
latency of 500–1.000 ms. During the teacup rubber hand condition, the forward edge of the 405 
teacup held by the rubber hand was stroked, whereas the front edge of the wooden block was 406 
stroked during the wooden block condition. Again, experimenters were instructed to apply 407 
enough pressure to the teacup that participants could feel the contact between the brush and 408 
the teacup in their fingers. Each stimulation period lasted 180 s and was timed using a 409 
stopwatch. 410 
3.3.4 Procedure 411 
Participants were greeted and informed that they would be using a teacup and making 412 
self-perception estimates throughout the duration of the experiment. Based on their group 413 
assignment, all participants either first completed the water-transfer task or proceeded 414 
directly to the illusion phase, completing the water-transfer task upon its conclusion. During 415 
the illusion phase, participants were seated across from the experimenter with their right hand 416 
placed inside the same box used in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, the rubber hand and 417 
the participant’s hand were aligned such that both rested at the same distance in front of the 418 
participant’s chest with a lateral distance between the front of the participant’s teacup and the 419 
front of the teacup held by the rubber hand set to 27 cm (Lloyd, 2007).  420 
The lighting in the central compartment containing the teacup rubber hand was 421 
manipulated in the same manner as in Experiment 1: the lighting within the box during visuo-422 
tactile stimulation phases allowed the participant to view the rubber hand as it was stimulated 423 
by the experimenter, whereas the illumination from above during the position judgment phase 424 
obscured the rubber hand from view. 425 
 The proprioceptively perceived position of the participant’s hand was again used as a 426 
measure of the strength of the illusion, and the same protocol used in Experiment 1 for the 427 
judgment phase was followed. As before, the ruler was always shifted to a different random 428 
position between visuo-tactile stimulation phases so that the participant viewed different 429 
numbers each time they were asked to verbally report the position that was directly above the 430 
front edge of their held teacup. This judgment was made before and after each stimulation 431 
trial, so that the difference between the judgments—the proprioceptive drift—reflected the 432 
change in perceived hand position due to the stimulation.  433 
3.3.5 Results 434 
Proprioceptive Drift  435 
Assumptions of normal distribution, independence of residuals, and sphericity were 436 
met. We began by examining how proprioceptive drift was influenced by participant hand-437 
object correspondence, the timing of visuo-tactile stimulation, success at the water transfer 438 
task, and the recentness of experience with the teacup. To do so, we ran a mixed ANOVA 439 
with viewed object (teacup rubber hand vs. wooden block) and timing of visuo-tactile 440 
stimulation (synchronous vs. asynchronous) as within subject factors, weight of water 441 
transferred as a covariate, and experimental group (water-transfer task Prior to the Illusion 442 
versus After the Illusion) as the between group factor. 443 
The ANOVA revealed no significant main effects of viewed object, timing of visuo-444 
tactile stimulation, recentness of tool use, or amount of water transferred, (all F’s < 1.0). 445 
There was also no interaction between the viewed object and timing of visuo-tactile 446 
stimulation, (F(1,35) = 0.67), which indicated that the illusion was not experienced by 447 
participants as strong enough to induce proprioceptive drift (Figure 7).  448 
Figure 7. No interaction between viewed object and timing of visuo-tactile stimulation, 
(F(1,35) = 0.67), indicated that the illusion was not experienced by participants as strong 
enough to induce proprioceptive drift. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
Rubber Hand Illusion Questionnaire 449 
The mean ratings for the five components of the rubber hand illusion questionnaire 450 
(Embodiment, Loss of one’s hand, Movement, Affect, and Deafference) were submitted to a 451 
mixed ANOVA with the four illusion conditions (synchronous and asynchronous teacup 452 
rubber hand vs. synchronous and asynchronous wooden block), and the five components of 453 
the illusion as within-subject factors. Group (tool use prior vs. after the illusion) was the 454 
between-subject factor.  455 
The ANOVA revealed significant main effects of questionnaire component (F(1,35) = 456 
95.59, p < 0.001), illusion condition (F(1,35) = 6.96, p < 0.001), and group (F(1,35) = 43.04, 457 
p < 0.001) (Figure 8). A comparison of illusion conditions indicated that participants 458 
endorsed survey statements more positively in the synchronous teacup condition (M = -0.25, 459 
SD = 1.61) than in the other conditions (asynchronous teacup: M = -0.42, SD = 1.63; 460 
synchronous wooden block: M = -0.64, SD = 1.60; asynchronous wooden block: -0.81, SD = 461 
1.63). Importantly, planned comparisons between illusion conditions revealed a significant 462 
difference in responses to items related to Embodiment: (synchronous teacup: M = -0.68, SD 463 
= 1.57; asynchronous teacup: M = -1.23, SD = 1.43; synchronous wooden block: M = -1.63, 464 
SD = 1.22; asynchronous wooden block: M = -1.81, SD = 1.121; (F(1,3) = 5.19, p < 0.01). 465 
There was also a significant interaction between survey component and group, F(1,35) 466 
= 3.26, p < 0.05, such that individuals who used the teacup prior to experiencing the illusion 467 
tended to endorse statements regarding the loss of their own hand more positively (M = -0.07, 468 
SD = 1.23 ) than those who used the teacup after experiencing the illusion (M = -1.00, SD = 469 
1.24). Those who used the teacup first also endorsed more statements about affect, suggesting 470 
greater enjoyment of the experience (Tool Prior: M = 1.08, SD = 1.36; Tool After: M = 0.55, 471 
SD =1.19). In addition, those who used the teacup before the illusion endorsed more 472 
statements about deafference of their own hand during the illusion, agreeing more strongly to 473 
sentiments such as the experience of pins and needles in their hand during the illusion (Tool 474 
Prior: M = 0.73, SD = 1.36; Tool After: M = -0.35, SD = 1.57). 475 
 
Figure 8. Comparing illusion conditions indicated that participants endorsed survey 
statements more positively in the synchronous teacup condition than in the other conditions. 
Importantly, there was also a significant difference in responses to items related to 
Embodiment between the synchronous teacup condition and all other conditions, indicating 
the need for synchrony in visuo-tactile stimulation, as well as correspondence between the 
viewed object (the teacup rubber hand) and the participant’s own hand in order for the 
participant to experience embodiment of the rubber hand. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
4. Cross-Experiment Comparison 476 
In both experiments, we compared participant error in the initial estimates of the 477 
position of their hand prior to inducing the illusion. The mean proprioceptive mislocalization 478 
prior to the induction of the illusion was -1.3 cm (SD= 4.9) for Chopsticks users in 479 
Experiment 1 and -2.97 cm (SD= 4.33) for Teacup users in Experiment 2, and the between-480 
groups mean difference, 1.58 BCa 95% CI [-0.299, 3.446] was not significant (t(97)= 1.65, p 481 
= 0.10, two-tailed). The absence of a significant difference suggests that participants in both 482 
the chopsticks and in the teacup rubber hand experiments had comparable awareness of the 483 
location of their tool-holding hand prior to the induction of the illusion. 484 
In order to directly compare the success of the chopsticks and teacup versions of the 485 
illusion, the difference between each participant’s drift during the synchronous tool condition 486 
and the asynchronous tool condition was submitted to an independent samples t-test. The 487 
difference was found to be statistically significant, t(97) = 3.82, p < .001; d = 0.77; 95% CI 488 
[0.36 , 1.19]. These results indicate that individuals in the chopsticks version of the illusion 489 
experienced a larger difference in drift between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions 490 
(M = 2.65, SD = 3.55) than did individuals in the teacup version of the illusion (M = -0.03, 491 
SD = 3. 41). 492 
Next, we compared the embodiment component of the RHI questionnaire for the 493 
synchronous tool condition for the two experiments using an independent samples t-test. The 494 
difference was found to be statistically significant, t(97) = 2.01, p < .05; d = 0.41; 95% CI [0, 495 
0.81]. These results indicate that individuals in the chopsticks version of the illusion 496 
experienced a stronger feeling of embodiment (M = -0.05, SD = 1.45) during the synchronous 497 
chopsticks condition than did individuals during the synchronous teacup condition (M = -498 
0.68, SD = 1. 57). 499 
5. Discussion 500 
The representation of the body is not fixed and immutable, but rather flexible and 501 
constantly updated according to the available multisensory inputs. This process of integration 502 
is pivotal both for a coherent feeling of body ownership and for the efficient use of tools. 503 
When we use a tool, the brain extracts its physical properties through the dynamic 504 
combination of multisensory inputs, and incorporates the object into the body representation 505 
(e.g. Iriki et al., 1996; Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001; Yamamoto et al., 2005). The current 506 
study adds to the growing literature on tool use and multisensory body representation by 507 
providing evidence that the representation of an embodied tool shows a plastic property 508 
similar to that of the body itself. 509 
 In the first experiment, we effectively induced the Rubber Hand Illusion (Botvinick & 510 
Cohen, 1998) leading to a recalibration of the felt position of an hand held object. Our results 511 
suggest that the brain treats the representation of an embodied tool in the same way as the 512 
representation of the effector wielding it. In other words, the representation of the tool is not 513 
immutable. Results show that when the incoming visual and tactile information is 514 
synchronized, the brain will adjust the proprioceptive representation of the hand-held 515 
object so that it feels closer to the seen object. Also, these data provide evidence that 516 
recentness of experience and the level of proficiency with the tool are pivotal factors in 517 
modulating the modification of the extended body representation. Participants who used the 518 
tool before the illusion and those who were more skilled users experienced significantly 519 
stronger proprioceptive drift during the illusion and responded more positively to the self-520 
report questionnaires assessing experiences of embodiment. In Experiment 2, we 521 
demonstrated that the illusion was not elicited with a different type of tool. This shows that 522 
the plastic adaptability of the body representation has some limits which may depend on the 523 
morphology of the tool. 524 
Previous work using the RHI paradigm has demonstrated that the illusion is successful only 525 
when the external object resembles an internally stored template of the human body and is 526 
placed in an anatomically plausible position (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Tsakiris & 527 
Haggard, 2005). For instance, the illusion is not successfully elicited when the rubber hand is 528 
replaced with a non-hand-shaped object, such as a wooden block, as reflected by lower 529 
proprioceptive drift in this condition (Haans, IJsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2008). This constraint 530 
on representational plasticity is functional, as it guarantees coherence in body representation. 531 
Without this constraint, coincidental multisensory stimulation might result in the perception 532 
of non-corporeal objects as being part of one’s own body. 533 
In light of this, and other experiments, the RHI has been explained using a two way 534 
model where: a bottom up process compares the temporal structure of the incoming sensory 535 
stimuli; and a top-down process compares these stimuli with a pre-existing internal 536 
representation of one’s own body (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Only if both comparisons pass, 537 
a feeling of ownership can arise. In the classical RHI illusion paradigm, a rubber hand 538 
matches the internal (visual) representation of the body. Tools do not match this template, and 539 
yet in Experiment one, the RHI was successfully induced for a hand-held tool. In keeping 540 
with this idea, in our experiment participants were looking at a rubber hand holding the 541 
chopsticks while holding an identical pair of chopsticks in their own hand. In other words, 542 
though the chopsticks alone did not match the internally stored representation of the human 543 
hand, the template matching between participant’s hand (a hand holding a tool) with the 544 
external object (a rubber hand holding a tool) was preserved. Importantly, participants could 545 
feel the contact of the brush on their unseen chopsticks, so the congruency between the 546 
incoming visual and tactile inputs was also preserved—both were delivered to the chopsticks. 547 
Thus, in Experiment 1, both the template matching (top-down process) and congruency of 548 
visual and tactile inputs (bottom-up process) were similarly preserved. These two conditions 549 
were also preserved in Experiment 2, but the lack of proprioceptive drift and illusory 550 
ownership over the teacup-holding rubber hand suggests that not just any object held by a 551 
rubber hand can be successfully used to induce the RHI.  552 
Although Experiment 1 demonstrates that the representation of the extended body 553 
representation can be experimentally modified, there is also evidence that the unique 554 
relationship between tools and motoric body representations is also at play, as skilled 555 
chopstick users and those with more recent chopstick practice experienced a stronger illusion. 556 
This finding is in keeping with past experiments that consistently emphasize the necessity of 557 
prolonged practice with the tool for the expansion of one’s body representation to include the 558 
held tool (e.g. Maravita & Iriki, 2004). For instance, in the paradigmatic Iriki et al. (1996) 559 
experiment, the expansion of the visual-receptive fields was observed only after the macaque 560 
monkey received weeks of practice with the tool.  561 
However, there is some evidence of tool embodiment and tool-dependent remapping of 562 
space, even in the absence of extensive practice with a tool (Berti & Frassinetti, 2000; 563 
Maravita et al., 2001). For instance, Naito and Ehrsson (2006) describe a modified version of 564 
the tendon vibration illusion (Goodwin, McCloskey, & Matthews, 1972) to investigate the 565 
perceptual aspect of hand-object interaction. They found that vibrating the tendon of wrist 566 
extensor while participants holding a ball induced the illusory perceived movement of the 567 
“hand-object-complex”, and that this sensation is mediated by specific parietal mechanisms 568 
that seem to link the external object with our own hand when the wielded tool becomes 569 
incorporated into the body image (ibidem). 570 
These findings are consistent with our results, which demonstrate that holding the tool 571 
while receiving visuo-tactile stimulation is sufficient to elicit the RHI for an external tool, 572 
though the illusion is enhanced if experienced immediately following practice with the tool. 573 
This result suggests that humans are able to rapidly infer the characteristics of simple tools 574 
and incorporate them into the body representation. This interpretation is also supported by 575 
previous findings showing that stimuli delivered at the tip of a tool (such as drumsticks), are 576 
perceived as occurring at the tip of the tool, even when the tool is occluded from view 577 
(Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001).  578 
Although tools can be rapidly incorporated, tool practice and skill still play a pivotal 579 
role in their embodiment. Tool embodiment is stronger after recent use and for participants 580 
who are more skilled in using the tool. For instance, Rademaker et al. (2014) provided 581 
evidence of a rapid integration of objects held by chopsticks (second-order extension) into the 582 
body representation. However, extensive chopstick training over a period of weeks further 583 
augmented the level of integration. Moreover, greater chopstick skill was predictive of more 584 
rapid integration of the second-order object held by the chopsticks. Our data support and 585 
extend these findings by showing that even a short experience using the tool (as the 5-minute 586 
practice session used in our Experiment) can lead to a stronger modification of the body 587 
representation, as suggested by higher proprioceptive drifts and illusion scorings in the CRHI 588 
compared to participants who used the chopsticks after the induction of the illusion.  589 
Even so, the null finding in Experiment 2 indicates that the mere categorical 590 
membership in the family of ‘tools’ is not sufficient to allow wielders of all manner of objects 591 
to experience a modified RHI. Even though the participants have had a lifetime of experience 592 
using teacups effectively and the template matching was conserved in Experiment 2 593 
(participants held a teacup and saw a teacup held by a rubber hand), participants did not 594 
experience the illusion. Several factors can account for the difference in results obtained from 595 
the two tools used in Experiments 1 and 2.  596 
For instance, the difference might be explained by a different tactile feedback provided 597 
by each tool, or whether or not tactile feedback is even expected to occur during tool use.  598 
The two tools might involve a greater or smaller contact with the skin surface and 599 
differently involve the passive stimulation of un-myelinated C tactile (CT) fibers. CT are 600 
slow conducting fibers that mostly convey information about innocuous and light tactile 601 
stimuli, particularly slow stroking (Liljencrantz & Olausson, 2014; Vallbo, Olausson, & 602 
Wessberg, 1999) and are only found in the hairy skin (Vallbo et al., 1999; Wessberg & 603 
Norrsell, 1993). Thus, this system is particularly important in conveying interoceptive and 604 
motivational information usually referred to as pleasant or affective touch.  605 
The activation of CT fibers could be relevant here, because of their role in body 606 
ownership. For instance, it has been shown that slow velocity touch on hairy skin produces 607 
higher levels of embodiment during the RHI compared with fast, neutral touch (Crucianelli, 608 
Metcalf, Fotopoulou, & Jenkinson, 2013). One could argue that the difference observed 609 
between chopsticks and teacup could be explained by a differential contact with hairy skin 610 
and, thus, greater or lesser involvement of CT fibers. Chopsticks mostly rest on the palmar 611 
(glabrous) side of the hand. In particular, the first of the two chopsticks (the closest to the 612 
handler), rests approximately on: thenar eminence (over the abductor pollicis muscle, on the 613 
palm and only partially the back of the hand) and the third phalanx of the middle and ring 614 
finger. The second chopsticks mostly rests on: first, second and third phalanx of the index 615 
finger and the third phalanx (the fingertips) of the thumb and the middle finger (Schwarz, 616 
1955) (see figure 9A). As for the teacup, the areas of contact with the skin are mostly the 617 
third (distal) phalanx of the thumb (palmar side), and the second phalanx of the index, middle 618 
and ring finger, both on the dorsal and palmar side of the hand (ibidem) (see figure 9B). 619 
A.  B.  
Figure 9. The manner in which participants were instructed to hold A) the chopsticks, and B) the 
teacup. Hashed lines demark where the tool came into contact with the participant’s hand, with 
white lines marking glabrous skin innervated with C-fibers and black lines denoting skin on the 
surface of the palm. The middle portion of the bottom chopstick held in A also made contact with 
the participant’s ring finger. The tip of the chopsticks rested on the surface of the table. Participants 
rested their pinky and the blade of their hand on the surface of the table in the teacup condition 
pictured in B. The bottom of the cup did not come into contact with the table. These positions were 
chosen in order to match the position of the rubber hands as closely as possible.  
 620 
In both cases, the median nerve supplies all the areas of the skin in contact with the 621 
tool, although the teacup might have a slightly greater contact with hairy skin. Even though 622 
this difference looks negligible, it cannot be excluded that the two tools are partially subject 623 
to a different neural processing in the central nervous system (that is, discriminative vs 624 
emotional touch (e.g. McGlone, Vallbo, Olausson, Loken, & Wessberg, 2007). However, 625 
there are reasons to believe that this is not the case. For instance, Lloyd et al (2013) tested 626 
whether the embodiment of a RH was increased when slow (pleasant) touch was delivered to 627 
the back (hairy skin) of a hand (which should result in C-Fibers activation) as compared to 628 
the palm (glabrous skin) (which should not result in C-Fibers activation). Their results 629 
present a complex picture in which several factors contribute to the illusory experience. 630 
In particular, they found that pleasantness of touch and stroking speed moderate the 631 
subjective experience of body ownership (assessed by questionnaires) but not the 632 
objective measure of the illusion (proprioceptive drift). This measure was instead 633 
affected by stroking site, with greater proprioceptive drift and ratings of embodiment 634 
when stroking was applied on the back of the hand rather than the palm. According to 635 
the authors, this difference may be due to greater spatial resolution on the palm than on 636 
the back of the hand. In fact, the palm of the hand contains more bi-modal neurons that 637 
encode for both visual and tactile stimuli, which could explain the smaller error (drift) 638 
when stimulation is delivered to the palm (ibidem). Therefore, contrary to what we 639 
observed, given that the teacup involves a greater contact with the back of the hand, one 640 
would expect greater illusion with this tool then with chopsticks. Typically, chopsticks 641 
are wielded to manipulate the items on one’s plate, whereas teacups are used to transport 642 
liquid to the lips. This highlights the functional difference between the two tools: we 643 
hypothesize that an important factor in determining whether or not the body representation is 644 
recalibrated to include the tool is the matching between the function of the tool and the grip 645 
exerted to wield the tool itself. In the case of chopsticks, this matching criterion is met: the 646 
participant’s hand operates the chopsticks using a precision grip. The chopsticks, in turn, 647 
afford precision motor actions. This is not the case for teacups. Participants use a precision 648 
grip to support the teacup’s handle, but the teacup functions not as a precision grabber, but 649 
instead like cupped hands.  650 
The importance of tool morphology is not completely novel to research on the plastic 651 
features of the body representation. For instance, Miller et al. (2014) highlighted the role of 652 
tool morphology in tool embodiment by showing that morphological similarity between the 653 
tool and the effector constrains tool-induced representational plasticity. In other words, hand-654 
shaped tools lead to greater modulation of the implicit representation of the hand, whereas 655 
arm shaped tools lead to greater modulation of the representation of the arm. Likewise, 656 
chopsticks mimic the human precision grip and are wielded with a precision grip, which may 657 
facilitate their incorporation. This match is absent from the teacup. However, there are many 658 
ways in which chopsticks and teacups differ. Our functional matching account is speculative 659 
and in need of further research. Future experiments could address the role of tool 660 
functionality on its incorporation in the body representation (and its online update), for 661 
instance by systematically manipulating the matching between the grip necessary to operate 662 
the tool (such as precision or power grips) and the motor actions afforded by the tool itself. 663 
A relevant question that is difficult to address with the present results regards whether 664 
the position of the tool is calculated in an allocentric or egocentric frame of reference. 665 
Previous evidence seems to suggest that, following tool use, the relative position of the hand 666 
becomes less relevant in respect to the representation of the embodied effector. As stated 667 
previously (see introduction), although somatosensory sensation necessarily originates from 668 
the fingers when touching something with a too, these tactile signals are processed as if 669 
referred directly to the tip of the tool (Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001). If this is the case, then 670 
one could expect that what is been recalibrated is the coordinates of the tool itself rather than 671 
the hand wielding it. In fact, previous studies with the RHI show that the illusion is restricted 672 
to the locus of stimulation: only the stimulated finger is perceived to be closer to the rubber 673 
hand, but not the neighbouring, unstimulated fingers ( Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Moreover, 674 
following tool use the precision of tool-related reachability judgment improves, whereas the 675 
arm representation and its capabilities become less precise (Bourgeois, Farnè, & Coello, 676 
2014; Costantini, Ambrosini, Sinigaglia, & Gallese, 2011). Thus, one could speculate that the 677 
proprioceptive drift observed with the chopsticks pertains the coordinate of the tool itself 678 
rather than its relative position with the hand. However, literature on this subject is not 679 
conclusive. Most likely, the allocentric and egocentric frame of reference are not mutually 680 
exclusive, but rather their relative dominance is determined by multiple factors, such as the 681 
type of tool and the transformation necessary to use it (e.g., Massen & Sattler, 2010). Future 682 
experiments could specifically tackle this question, for instance investigating whether in our 683 
modified rubber hand with tool paradigm the representation of the hand is also recalibrated 684 
along with the representation of the tool.  685 
To conclude, our results support the idea the body can be extended to objects that do 686 
not resemble the human body. In two experiments we showed for the first time, to the extent 687 
of our knowledge, that the perceptual binding of visual and tactile information delivered to a 688 
hand-held tool can induce an online modification of the internal representation of the tool 689 
itself. In particular, this finding is far reaching, as it shows that the body representational 690 
plasticity is even more flexible than previously expected and supports the idea that tools are 691 
treated as part of one’s own body. Moreover, if the representation of our own body is 692 
constantly updated and can be modified according to the available multisensory integration, 693 
then this is also true for an embodied tool. 694 
In addition, the present experiments shed light on the importance of recent experience 695 
and tool skill on the plasticity of the body. Participants who had a chance to practice and 696 
those who were more skilled tool users experienced a stronger illusion. Finally, we show that 697 
the illusion was not elicited with all tools, suggesting that some properties of the tool may 698 
constrain whether or not the body representation is affected by using the tool.  699 
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 831 
  832 
APPENDIX A: Chopstick Version of the Rubber Hand Illusion Questionnaire 833 
In the questions below, -3 corresponds to "completely disagree", while +3 corresponds to 834 
"completely agree". 0 corresponds to "neither agree nor disagree". 835 
Please answer the following questions about your experience using the scale from -3 to +3. 836 
  837 
 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
It seemed like I was looking directly at my own hand holding 
chopsticks, rather than at a rubber hand holding chopsticks.          
It seemed like the chopsticks I was holding were in the location where 
the rubber hand was holding the chopsticks.          
It seemed like the rubber hand holding chopsticks was moving 
towards my hand.          
It seemed like the rubber hand holding chopsticks was my hand.          
It seemed like I had three hands.          
It seemed like the rubber hand holding chopsticks was part of my 
body.          
I had the sensation of pins and needles in my hand.          
It seemed like the rubber hand holding chopsticks was in the location 
where my hand was.          
It seemed like the rubber hand holding chopsticks belonged to me.          
I found that experience interesting.          
It seemed like I could have moved the chopsticks in the rubber hand if 
I had wanted.          
It seemed like my own hand became rubbery.          
It seemed like I was unable to move the chopsticks in my hand.          
It seemed like my hand had disappeared.          
The touch of the paintbrush on my chopsticks was pleasant.          
It seemed like my hand was out of control.          
I found that experience enjoyable.          
It seemed like I could have moved the chopsticks in my hand if I had 
wanted.          
It seemed like my hand was moving towards the rubber hand.          
It seemed like I was in control of the chopsticks in the rubber hand.          
It seemed like I couldn’t really tell where my hand was.          
It seemed like the experience of my hands was less vivid than normal.          
I had the sensation that my hand was numb.          
It seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching 
the chopsticks held by the rubber hand.          
It seemed like the rubber hand began to resemble my real hand.          
APPENDIX B: Tables of Descriptive Statistics for 3-Way Interactions 838 
  839 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for 3-way interaction of Skill, Tactile stimulation, and Viewed Object  
Beads Transferred Tactile Stimulation Viewed Object M SD 
44 
Synchronous 
Chopstick 2.66 0.66 
Wood -0.59 0.66 
Asynchronous 
Chopstick 0.21 0.66 
Wood 1.32 0.66 
75 
Synchronous 
Chopstick 2.66 0.45 
Wood 0.40 0.45 
Asynchronous 
Chopstick -0.05 0.45 
Wood 0.25 0.45 
106 
Synchronous 
Chopstick 2.66 0.78 
Wood 1.38 0.78 
Asynchronous 
Chopstick -0.30 0.78 
Wood -0.81 0.78 
Note. Skill was quantified as the number of beads participants transferred with chopsticks 
in a 5 minute period. The mean number of beads transferred (75) is shown here with ±1 SD for 






Descriptive Statistics for 3-way interaction of Skill, Time of Tool Use, and Viewed Object 
Beads Transferred Time of Tool Use Viewed Object M SD 
44 
Tool First 
Chopstick 1.27 0.77 
Wood 1.55 0.77 
Tool Second 
Chopstick 1.57 0.73 
Wood -0.66 0.73 
75 
Tool First 
Chopstick 1.75 0.52 
Wood 1.00 0.52 
Tool Second 
Chopstick 0.92 0.50 
Wood -0.26 0.50 
106 
Tool First 
Chopstick 2.24 0.84 
Wood 0.45 0.84 
Tool Second 
Chopstick 0.26 0.92 
Wood 0.13 0.92 
Note. Skill was quantified as the number of beads participants transferred with chopsticks 
in a 5 minute period. The mean number of beads transferred (75) is shown here with ±1 SD for 
comparison of drift at different levels of skill, time of tool use (before or after the illusion), and 
viewed object.  
